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I. Problem and Analysis.
Is it an actionable wrong to induce one person to terminate
existing contract relations with another, or to refrain from
entering into contract relations with another? This question
has been frequently before the courts of late, and has just
been considered and one phase of it decided, with great and
even solemn deliberation, by the English House of Lords in
the case of Allen v. Flood.' Its importance to the industrial
world can hardly be overestimated. Its correct solution is
primarily the concern of courts and lawyers, but the results of
the solution will touch every trader, employer and workman
in his most vital interests. The decision of the House of
Lords, fixing as it does the law of England, may, therefore,
fittingly be made the text for a review of the question upon
principle and authority.
In order to approach the subject in an intelligible way; it
will be well to analyze the various circumstances under which
the question may arise. In such an analysis it will be found
that these elements must be considered:
I 1898, A. C. I.
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I. The contract right alleged to be invaded.
II. The actor who is alleged to have invaded such right.
III. The means employed in such alleged invasion.
IV. The motives of the actor in interfering with the alleged
contract right.
Under each of these heads the possible cases may be
classified as follows:
I. The contract right may be,-(i) an existing contract not
terminable without breach; (2) an existing contract relation
terminable at will; (3) a proposed, future contract relation.
II. The actor may be, (I) a single person; (2) a combination of persons.
III. The means employed may be,-(i) intrinsically unlawful, as deceit, duress, etc.; (2) intrinsically lawful, as persua-sion, advice, the withdrawal of industrial benefits, etc.
IV. The motive may be,--(i) malicious; (2) non-malicious.
Upon this analysis it is proper to observe: first, that while
under I., cases 2 and 3 are separated for completeness of
analysis it is doubtful whether the law, as yet, presents any
distinction as to the principles applicable to them; second,
that under I., I, and I., 2, 3, there may be present any possible
combination of the cases under II., III. and IV. For example,
B, or B, C and D, may induce X to terminate (with or without
breach) an existing contract relation with A, either by
intimidation or by persuasion, and either with or without
malicious motives against A. Given any combination thus
suggested, has A an action against B (or B, C and D) for
the damages sustained in consequence of the termination of
the contract relation by X?
Having thus indicated the nature and scope of the problem,
we may proceed to discuss it under two heads,-first, inducing
breach of contract; second, inducing termination (without
breach), or non-formation, of contract.
II. Inducing Breach of Contract.
Three leading English cases are authority for the statement
that it is actionable for B, or for B, C and D, to induce X to
commit a breach of an existing contract with A, by unlawful
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means, or by persuasion coupled with malicious or unjustifiable
motives.' The only point of difficulty experienced in studying
these decisions is in fixing the meaning of the term "malicious."
As defined by the court in the case of Bowen v. Hall, it is,
" the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or of benefiting
the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff." In short, it
would seem that inducing the breach of an existing contract is
actionable if the main object be to injure plaintiff or to benefit
defendant at the expense of plaintiff. It is clear that the second
object may involve no malevolence or ill-will toward plaintiff. It
may be simply a competitive motive, a desire to drive a good
bargain. A has engaged X; B desires to employ X. B induces
X to break with A and contract with B, by outbidding A. There
is no desire to injure A, but a desire to benefit B. This is
known, however, to result in loss or damage to A. It is
actionable unless B can justify the infliction of the loss or
damage. "Malice," therefore, is the infliction of loss or
damage without lawful justification and not, necessarily, ill-will
or malevolence. A desire to benefit the actor, who is in competition with plaintiff, is not a lawful justification for inducing
X to break an existing contract with plaintiff; it would be a
justification for inducing X to terminate (without breach) a
contract with plaintiff or to refrain from closing a proposed
contract with plaintiff.
The reasoning by which this result is reached maybe stated
as follows: It is unlawful to break an existing contract. It is
unlawful knowingly and intentionally to persuade another to
do an unlawful act. It is therefore unlawful for B, wilfully
and with notice of the contract, to induce X to commit a
breach of an existing contract with A. The number of the
actors, the means 'employed, the motive of the actor, are all
immaterial in considering actions under this head. So runs
the comment of Lord Herschell in Allen v. Flood2 upon the
judgment of the court in the leading case of Lumley v. Gye,8
1

Lumley v. Gye (1853), 2 R. & B. 216; Bowen v. Hall (I88I), L. R. 6
D. 333; Temperton v. Russell (1893), I Q. B. 75.
See also Lord Watson, p. 96.
2 1898, A. C. it, 23.

Q. B.

3 2 B. & B. 216.
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followed by the caution, however, that he "must not be understood as expressing an opinion one way or the other, whether
such an action can be maintained," a caution which is reechoed by Lord vlacnaghten,' and Lord Shand.'
It is to be observed, therefore, that while the English
courts have always spoken of this wrong as " malicious," and
it has been somewhat vaguely assumed that malice is essential
to the action, very grave doubts have now been expressed in
high quarters as to whether malice is at all material. It is to
be observed, further, that the question whether there is any
action for inducing breach of contract has not yet been passed
upon by the House of Lords, and that the lords who decided
the case of Allen v. Flood were careful to reserve their opinion
upon that point. That there would be an action in case
unlawful means were used, can hardly be doubted 3 But
whether there would be an action where only persuasion
coupled with malicious motive (or want of justification) is
employed, is yet to be decided by the highest English court.4
Should it be decided that an action will lie, there would still
remain the questions. What constitutes lawful justification?
Is competition a justification? Is a concern for the welfare
or morals of X a justification? Does the relationship of B to
X render B's interference lawful where the interference of
another would be unlawful? These and other like questions
have yet to be passed upon by the courts.
In the United States the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye has been
accepted and applied in some jurisdictions and rejected in
others. It is generally agreed that inducing breach of contract by unlawful means, as deceit, duress, and the like, is
actionable; but inducing termination of contract (without
breach), or non-performance of non-enforceable contract, by
I P. 153.
I68.
: See the remarks of Lord Watson in Allen v. Flood (1898), A. C. p. 96,
Lord Hersehell, p. 138, and the reasoning of Mogul Steamship Co. v.
Macgregor (1895), A. C. 587.
4 Lord Hershell points out (p. 143) that dissent or doubt was expressed
by Lord Coleridge in Bowen v. Hall, A. L. Smith, L. J., in Temperton v.
Russell, and Rigby, L. J., in Allen v. Flood (1895), 2 Q. B. 2r. The
reserve of several of the law lords on this point seems very significant.
2 11.
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like unlawful means, is equally actionable.' Is it actionable
to induce a breach of an existing contract by persuasion
Such
coupled with malice or absence of justification?
2
In
other
actionable
in
some
jurisdictions.
conduct is held
jurisdictions it is held non-actionable (unless, perhaps, in the
case of the enticement of servants).3 The authorities denying
liability expressly except from the decision the case of the
employment of deceit, slander, intimidation, or other unlawful
means, and reserve the question "as to the case of the enticement of a servant engaged in manual labor, where any form
The question
of the English Statute of Laborers is in force
whether a combination of persons inducing breach of contract
by persuasion or advice is liable where a single person would
not be, seems not to have arisen: it would, however, be
decided on the same principles as in the case of inducing
termination

(without breach)

by force

of

combination,-

principles discussed under the next head.
It will be observed, therefore, that while some American
states have followed

the present

English doctrine other

American states have followed the dissenting opinions in the
English cases and have already decided what the House of
Lords regards as an. open question, that inducing breach of
contract is not actionable unless the means employed are
unlawful.
III. Inducing Termination, Rescission, o1- Non-formation
of Contract.
In the cases just considered the act induced, namely, breach
of contract, is itself an unlawful act in the sense that the law
IBenton v. Pratt (1829), 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 385; Rice v. Manley (1876),
66 N. Y. 82; Lally v. Cantwell, 30 Mo. App. (1888) 524; Angle v,.
Chicago, St. Paul, &e., Ry. (1893), 151 U. S. i.
2 Walker v. Cronin (1871), 107 Mass.-55; Haskins v. Royster, (1874),
70 N. Car. 6oi ; Jones v. Stanly (1877), 76 N. C. 355 ; Angle v. Chicago,
St. Paul, &c., Ry. (893), 151 U. S. I (semble); Nashville, C. & St. L.
Ry. v. McConnell (1897), 82 Fed. 65.
Chambers v. Baldwin (i891), 91 Ky. 121; Bourlier Brothers v.
Macauley (1891), 91 Ky. 135, Boyson v. Thorn (1893), 98 Cal. 578;
Glencoe Land and Gravel Co. v. Commission Co. (1897), 138 Mo. 439.
91 Ky. 140-142; 98 Cal. 582.
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gives damages for it against the non-performing party to the
contract. In the cases now to be considered the party under
inducement commits no actionable wrong in yielding to the
persuasion of the inducing party. This may be because the
contract is terminable at will, or because the contract is subject
to rescission at will, or because no contract relation has yet
been formed. The problem now is, will it render B liable to
A, if B induce X to terminate a contract terminable at will, or
to rescind a contract subject to rescission at will, or to refrain
from concluding a proposed or probable contract? Terminating a contract is used in the sense of putting a stop to further
performance of a contract under which A has already been
engaged in performance. Rescission of contract is used in
the sense of exercising an option to be bound or not upon
a contract unenforceable by A, as, for example, a contract
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, or a contract
entered into by X's agent in excess of authority, and the like.
Non-formation of contract is used in the sense of exercising
the right not to enter into a proposed contract. In each case
the decision of X is understood to be influenced or induced
by the deceit, coercion, or persuasion of B.
If unlawful means be used by B, as deceit or duress, it is
generally conceded that B is liable to A, because in such case
it is not X's free will that has produced the result, but the
deceit or duress exercised by B, and operating through X.'
What constitutes duress will be discussed later.
If no unlawful means be used, but only persuasion or
advice coupled with a malicious motive to injure A or to
benefit B at the expense of A, then under the authority of
Allen v. Flood' no action will lie against B. Briefly stated,
that now famous case is this: Allen, a delegate of a trade
union of iron-workers, persuaded the Glengall Iron Company
to discharge Flood and another workman by representing
(truthfully) that if Flood and Taylor remained in the employ1

Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 385; Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 82;

Lally v. Cantwell, 30 Mo. App. 524; Evans v. Walton, L. R. (1867) 2 C.
P. 615; Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578 (semble).
2 1898, A. C. i.
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ment the iron-workers (about IOO in all) would quit for the
reason that Flood and Taylor, who were wood-workers, had
sometimes on other jobs done iron-work, and the iron-workers
were determined to prevent it. At the trial there was no
evidence of intimidation or coercion, or of breach of contract,
the engagement of Flood and Taylor being terminable at will.
The jury found that Allen maliciously induced the Glengall
Company to discharge Flood and Taylor and not to engage
them further. Damages were assessed at ,62o each. Kennedy, J., entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The Court of
Appeal (Lord Esher, M. R., Lopes and Rigby, L. JJ.)
affirmed the judgment.' On appeal to the House of Lords
there was an argument in December, 1895. A second argument was ordered and, following an infrequent custom, certain
judges were summoned to attend and give their opinion to the
law lords. Eight judges attended ; 2 of these, six advised that
the judgment be affirmed; two (Mathew and Wright) thought
the judgment should be reversed. Nine law lords rendered
the final decision. Of these, six 3 held that the defendant had
committed no actionable wrong; three 4 were for affirming
the judgmdnt. The sum of the reasoning on the final judgment is that it is not actionable to induce another to do what
he may rightfully do unless unlawful means are used or,
perhaps, unless there be a conspiracy of persons to produce
the result, and that it is immaterial that the defendant acted
maliciously.
The earlier precedents mainly discussed are Keeble v.
Hickeringill (I I East, 574 n.), Carrington v. Taylor (I I East,
571), Lumley v. Gye (2 E. & B. 216), Bowen v. Hall (6 Q. B.
D. 333) and Temperton v. Russell (1893, I Q. B. 715). The
general result of the examination of these cases is interesting.
Of Keeble v. Hickeringill,which was a case of one landowner
shooting guns with the sole object of frightening ducks away
1895, 2 Q. B. 21.
1

Hawkins, Mathew, Cave, North, Wills, Grantham, Lawrance and
H
Wright, JJ.
3 Lords Watson, Herschell, Macnaghten, Shand, Davey, and James of

Hereford.
'Lord Halsbury, L. C., Lords Ashbourne and Morris.
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from an adjoining landowner's decoy, the prevailing law lords
say in substance that the act was itself a nuisance and so unlawful, though there is a marked disposition to treat the case as of
slight authority.' Carrington v. Taylor, a case similar to
Keeble v. Rickeringill, except that defendant was here shooting
game in his own right and thereby disturbed plaintiff's decoy,
is practically set aside as bad law.' The other three cases, so
far as they hold that inducing breach of contract is actionable,
have already been referred to. Of Temperton v. Russell, so
far as it holds it actionable to induce one person not to enter
into new contracts with another, there is a decided disapproval,
subject to a reservation as to the question whether a con&IogwlSteamspiracy to produce such a result is actionable
skp Co. v. Jkfacgregor,4 is treated throughout as authority for
the prevailing judgment. None of the prevailing opinions
refers to American cases, though Lord Halsbury, L. C.,
(dissenting) cites several.5
The three dissenting law lords, the six advisory judges, the
three judges in the Court of Appeal, and the trial judge,
(thirteen out of the twenty-one judges who heard the case in
the three courts), place their judgment first, upon the proposition that intentionally causing damage without just cause or
excuse is actionable, and that the finding of a malicious motive
(under the circumstances of this case) negatives just cause or
excuse,' and second that Allen's acts constituted coercion over
the employer whose business would have been at a standstill
See Lord Herschell's observations on p. 134 and Lord Davey's on p.
174.
2 Lord Watson, p. 1O3, Lord Herschell, p. 135, Lord Shand, p. 169. It
will be observed that these two cases do not deal with interference with
contract. They are discussed to the point whether malicious motive is

material.
Watson, p. ioS, Lord Macnaghten, p. 153.
'1892, A. C. 25.
5
Walker V. Cronin (1871), 107 Mass. 555; Benton v. Pratt (1829),
3Lord

2

'Vend. (N. Y.) 385; Rice v. Manley (1876), 66 N. Y. 82 ; Bixby v.
Dunlap, (1876) 56 N. H. 456; Angle v. Chicago, Etc., Ry. (1893), 151
U.S.I.
6Lord Halsbury, L. C., PP. 75, 84; Lord Ashbourne, p.

p. 16o; Hawkins, J., p. 14.

1i2;

Lord Morris,
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had one-liundred.ironworkers left the yard.' Challenged to
point out what right of the plaintiffs has been invaded, they
reply " the right freely to pursue their lawful calling," quoting
with approval the statements of Sir William Erle in his work
on Trade Unions that,-" Every person has a right under the
law, as between him and his fellow-subjects, to full freedom in
disposing of his own labor or his own capital according to his
free will. It follows that every other person is subject to the
correlative duty arising therefrom, and is prohibited from any
obstruction to the fullest exercise of this right which can be
made compatible with the exercise of similar rights by others.
Every act causing an obstruction to another in the exercise of
the right comprised within this description, done, not in the
exercise of the actor's own right, but for the purpose of
obstruction, would, if damage should be caused thereby to the
party obstructed, be a violation of this prohibition, and the
violation of this prohibition by a single person is a wrong, to
be remedied either by action or by indictment, as the case
may be."
In short, the decision that defendant is liable seems to be
placed by thesejudges mainly on these propositions: (i) Flood
and Taylor had a legal right to pursue their calling without
interference; (2) Allen interfered and damage resulted; (3)
this interference was so decisive as to be fairly regarded as
the efficient cause of the damage (rather than the act of the
employer); (4) this interference was without just cause or
excuse, or, in other words, malicious.
This difference of view between the prevailing and the
earlier advisory and dissenting opinions is very fundamental
and will be discussed later in this article. It answers our
present purpose to note that the prevailing opinions find no
intimidation or unlawful means used to control the employer's
conduct in dismissing plaintiffs, while the other opinions find
that defendant's threat was coercive and that no ground of
justification was established.
We have now to examine the state of the American
1Pp.

17, 80, i6o.
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authorities upon the questions involved in Allen v. Flood, and
analogous cases.
It may be stated, at the outset, that the use of intrinsically
unlawful means, as fraud or intimidation, will render the interfering defendant liable to the injured plaintiff. It is, perhaps,
not difficult to determine what is fraudulent or deceitful.' But
it is more difficult to extract from the decisions a clear notion
of what will amount to duress or intimidation. Some cases,
to be sure, so clearly involve ntimidation as to leave no room
for doubt.' Other cases involve a kind of constructive intimidation, as a display of force by a body of men where no force
is actually used or even expressly threatened. Thus, the
display of banners with devices, as a means of intimidation to
prevent persons from entering into or continuing in the employment of plaintiff, has been held unlawful, although there
was no proof that the inscriptions were false or misleading.3
In other cases a mere display of force by a body of men,
although no force was actually used or expressly threatened,
has been held to amount to intimidation.4 Under these latter
decisions it was held unlawful for a body of persons to assemble
in force in the vicinity of a place where workmen were
employed in order to induce such workmen to quit the
employment or to refrain from entering into it. In another
case the question upon which the court divided was whether
a patrol of two men in front of the plaintiff's place of business,
stationed there to give notice of the strike and to persuade
workmen not to enter the employment, constituted such
intimidation as to be unlawful.' The majority of the court
thought the patrol should be enjoined as one means of intimi-

I Stone

v. Carlan (185o), 13 Law Reporter, 36o S. C. 2 Sandf. N. Y.

Sup. Ct. 738; Marsh v. Billings (i85r), 7 Cush. 322; Rice v. Manley
(1876), 66 N. Y. 82; Dudley v. Briggs (1886), 141 Mass. 582; Weinstock
v. Marks (1895), 1O9 Cal. 529.
2 Shoe Co. v. Saxey (1895),

131 Mo. 212; Wick China Co. v. Brown
(0894), 164 Pa. 449.
3 Sherry v. Perkins (1888), 147 Mass. 212.
4O'Neil v. Behanna (1897), 182 Pa. 236; Mackall v. Ratchford (1897),

82 Fed. 41.

r Vegelahn v. Guntner (1896), 167 Mass. 92.
(1897), 6 Pa. Dist. Rep. 524.

See also Cook v. Dolan
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dation and of rendering the employment unpleasant or
intolerable to workmen. " Intimidation," says the prevailing
opinion, "is not limited to threats of violence or of physical
injury to person or property. It has a broader signification,
and there also may be a moral intimidation which is illegal.
Patrolling or picketing, under the circumstances stated in the
report, has elements of intimidation like those which were
found to exist in Sherry v. Perkins." 1 From this conclusion
two judges I dissented, on the ground that the patrol carried
with it no threat of violence, and that the means used by the
patrol, namely, persuasion and advice, were lawful and justifiable in a competitive struggle between employer and employed.
Another form of compulsion, which may be regarded as
intimidation, is the instituting, or threatening to institute, a
boycott against A in order to prevent him from entering into
contract relations necessary to the successful conduct 'of his
business. This may involve A's rights alone, or it may also
involve the rights of X. Thus the object may be to compel
A to pay the defendants higher wages by inducing X (or X,
Y and Z) not to deal with A until such higher wages are
granted; or it may be to compel X to cease dealing with A
in order to compel A to deal with defendants on their terms..
In the first case A alone can complain; in the second case
A and X may both complain. To illustrate: Defendants
desire to compel A to cease using a machine for hooping
barrels. They threaten to notify plaintiff's customers not to
purchase his machine-hooped barrels, and to notify all
members of labor organizations, and others, not to purchase
articles packed in machine-hooped barrels. Requesting A's
customer (X) not to purchase A's barrels would affect A alone,
unless X were also put under compulsion. Notifying X's
customer (Y) not to buy goods packed in A's barrels affects
both A and X, because it may interfere with X's freedom to
purchase A's barrels or to sell goods to Y, and also A's chance
of selling barrels to X. In this case the conduct of defendants
is regarded by the majority of the court as intimidation, and
1 147 Mass. 212.
2 Mr. ChiefJustice Field and Mr. Justice Holmes.
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hence an unlawful interference with A, although the dissenting judge (in a very learned and vigorous opinion) regards it
as lawful competition between employer and employed.' The
question does not arise as to X's rights. Again, a circular
requesting the public to boycott plaintiff's newspaper, in order
to compel plaintiff to cease using plate matter or to employ
union labor, is intimidation and unlawful.' A circular requesting the public not to deal with merchants whd advertise in
plaintiff's paper would affect the advertising merchants as well
as plaintiff So a notice to .an employer (X) that if he continues to employ A, "we will be compelled to notify all labor
organizations of the city that your house is a non-union one,"
is intimidation of X, and if A is thereby discharged A has an
action against defendants although A's contract is terminable
at will.' Had the threat been carried out and X's customers
induced to cease dealing with him, X also would have been
injured. In general it may be said that instituting, or threatening to institute a boycott by concerted action is unlawful.
It may take various forms but in its essence it is minatory and
is calculated to interfere in a dangerous degree with the
freedom of industrial action.'
A puzzling phase of the boycott is presented in those cases
where dealers combine to drive out of business a competitor
who shall refuse to conform to the business methods fixed by
the members of the combination, or to refuse to deal with any
person who shall offend against the rules. Several cases have
upheld the lawfulness of the means adopted by these combinations. A manufactures and sells lumber. An association of
retailers agree that they will not buy of manufacturers who
sell directly to consumers. A sells to consumers. The
secretary of the association threatens to notify the members
1 Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co. (1897), 83 Fed. 912.
2Barr
v. Fssex Trades Council (1894), 53 N. J. Eq. ioi; Casey v.
Cincinnati Typo. Union (189i), 45 Fed. 135. See also Old Doam. S. Co.
v. McKenna (I887), 30 Fed. 48.
3 Lucke v. Clothing, &c., Assembly (1893), 77 Md. 396.
lMoores v. Bricklayers' Union (Ohio Super. Ct., 189o), 23 Weekly Law
Bull. 48; Thomas v. Cincinnati, &c., R. (1894), 62 Fed. 8o3.
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not to deal with A. This is held lawful.' Again: A is a
plumber. An association of plumbers agree not to deal with
wholesalers who sell to plumbers not conforming to the rules
of the association, the practical result being that all conforming plumbers must join the association or one of it3 branches.
A is unable to secure supplies. This is held lawful competition.' A combination agreeing not to sell to any person who
is a delinquent debtor of any member of the association is held
lawful, and such delinquent debtor has no action against the
member giving notice of delinquency or against a member
refusing to deal with him until he pays the creditor 3 On the
other hand it has been held that if defendants not only refuse
to sell to plaintiff but also induce a third person not to sell to
plaintiff, such interference in plaintiff's business is unlawful
unless it can be shown to be justifiable as serving some legitimate purpose of the defendants.4 So also where retail dealers
in lumber combine and agree not to deal with wholesalers who
sell to a lumber broker, not maintaining a lumber yard, and
in pursuance of this agreement "fine " X, a wholesaler who
has sold to plaintiff, a lumber broker, and in consequence
plaintiff is thereafter unable to procure lumber of X, or of
other wholesalers, it is held that plaintiff may maintain an
action against defendants since defendants' conduct amounts to
intimidation.' So also where there is an understanding that
employers engaged in a certain business shall notify each
other of the names of "apprentices" who leave the employment, and that one will not employ the apprentice of another,
and defendant, in pursuance of this understanding, gives notice
that plaintiff has left his employment, in consequence of which
I Bohn

Mfg. Co. v. Hollis (1893), 54 Minn. 223.
v. Tierney (R. I., 1895), 33 Atl. I.

2 Macauley

3Schulten v. Bavarian Brewing Co. (1894), 96 Ky. 224; Brewster v.

Miller (Ky. 1897), 41 S. W. 301.
4

Delz v. Winfree (189i), 8o Texas, 4oo; see also Olive v. Van Patten

(1894), 7 Tex. Civ. App. 630; Sweeny v. Torrence

(1892), 1

Pa. Dist.

Rep. 622.
5Jackson v. Stanfield (1894), 13 7 ind. 592, disapproving Bohn Mfg. Co.
v. Hollis, ante.
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plaintiff is unable to secure or hold new employment, the
defendant is liable to plaintiff.'
In the cases cited in the preceding paragraph there is a prior
agreement that upon a certain contingency one, or some, or
all of the members of the combination will cease dealing with
all persons of a designated class. The contingency is the
business conduct of the persons in question. All whose
business methods (though lawful) are obnoxious to the system
adopted by the members of the combination are to fall into a
tabooed class. Notice is to be given that A, B, C, etc., are
taboo. Nobody in the combination is thereafter to have
commerce with them. They are industrially excommunicated.
The contingency may or may not affect the rights of some
third person. Thus, if A sells direct to a consumer (X) A is
taboo ;2 or, if A sells to a taboo retailer (X), A is taboo also ;3
or if A does not pay his debt to a member of the combination,
A is taboo.4 In the first two cases A and the consumer, or A
and the retailer, are both affected. In the third case A alone
is affected. In either case one defendant "notifies" the other
members that A's conduct creates the contingency contemplated, or an agent of all the members gives like notice, and
A is forthwith excommunicated. At the same time X may
be expressly put under the ban, because it may have been
simply because A dealt with X that A is boycotted. A warning is thereby given to all in like circumstances with A not to
deal with X. The problem now raised is whether, conceding
that the notifying member or agent would have been liable to
A or X if no such prior agreement had existed, he escapes
liability because of such agreement. If the defendant notifies Z
that A's conduct in dealing with X is obnoxious to defendant,
or that A's conduct is itself obnoxious without reference to X,
and requests or persuades Z to cease existing relations with A,
and if A or X has an action against defendant for this unlawful

I Blumenthal v. Shaw (1897), 77 Fed. 954; Mattison v. Lake Shore, Etc.,
R.. (1895), 2 Oh. N. P. 276.
2Bohn v. Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, sup ra.
3Macauley v. Tierney, sutifra.

4Brewster v. Miller, supra.
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interference with his freedom of industrial action, is an agreement between defendant and Z that defendant shall notify Z in
case A's conduct becomes obnoxious, and that thereupon
both defendant and Z will taboo A, a lawful agreement which
may be set up as a bar to A's or X's action? This inquiry
into the legality of such agreements seems to have been little
considered in the cases cited, but was expressly considered
and decided in the recent case of Curran v. Galen.' In that
case plaintiff brought an action against G and W (officers of a
trade union) for having procured his dismissal from employment in a brewery, because he refused to join the union.
Defendants set up an agreement between an association of
brewers and the union that all employes of the brewery
companies belonging to the association should be members of
the union and that no employe should work for a longer period
than four weeks without becoming a member, and set up that
in pursuance of this agreement defendants notified plaintiff's
employer, a member of the association and a party to the
agreement, that plaintiff had refused for more than four weeks
to join the union. The court held the answer bad because it
disclosed an illegal agreement, the object of which was to
interfere with the freedom of the individual to dispose of his
labor and to coerce the individual into conforming to the
business methods of the defendants under penalty of the loss of
his position and of his prospects. If there had been no agreement, defendants' interference with plaintiff's freedom to
pursue his lawful trade or calling would have been unlawful ;
the agreement is an agreement to interfere with such freedom,
and is itself unlawful.
There is yet another class of cases where the defendant,
acting alone, with no concert with others, brings pressure to
bear upon X to induce him to cease dealing with plaintiff
The clearest types of these cases are those where an employer
of labor directs his employes not to deal with the plaintiff
upon pain of discharge from the employment. It has been
held lawful for an employer to forbid his employes to rent
1I52

N. Y. 33 (1897)-
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plaintiff's house I or to trade at plaintiff's store 2 and for a
quarry owner having a contract with X, terminable at will, for
the cutting of stone, to compel X to discharge a workman on
pain of the termination of the contract.3 On the other hand it
has been held unlawful for defendant to forbid his employes to
trade at plaintiff's store.' In a recent case it was held lawful
for an employer who also ran a store in competition with
plaintiff to forbid his employes to trade with plaintiff, though
it was suggested in the opinion that it would be unlawful if
defendant had not been in competition with plaintiff'
This last case seems to bring out sharply the real question
at issue, namely, whether defendant may use even his own
legal rights as an instrument of wilful harm to plaintiff without
any other justification than the abstract right to do as he
pleases with his own. Malice is often said to be the test in
these cases. The conflict waged over the meaning and limits
of that term, renders its.use a source of added difficulty. It
is perhaps enough to say that if defendant inflicts intentional
loss upon plaintiff, defendant is liable to repair the loss unless
he can justify its infliction. We should then be forced into the
added difficulty of defining the grounds of justification, but
this is certainly a more concrete legal question than that pertaining to malice which, after all, will ordinarily have to be
inferred from the absence of justification. It is easy enough
to see the difference between the case of a man who interferes
with a competitor's business in order to obtain business for
himself and the case of a man who interferes in another's
business for no apparent purpose except to injure the other.
Heywood v. Tillson (1883), 75 Me. 225.
Payne v. Western, &c., Ry. (1884), 13 Lea, 507.
3 Raycroft v. Tayntor (1896), 68 Vt. 219.
'

4Graham v. St. Charles St. Ry. (1895), 47 La. Ann. 214; again, 47
La. Ann. 1656.
5 Robison v. Texas Pine Land Ass'n (Tex. Civ. App. 1897), 40 S. 7.
843. This is the point of difference between Keeble v. Hickeringill and
Carrington v. Taylor, discussed above. In the first case defendant
showed no justification; in the second he was shooting game himself,
and should have been justified if his shooting was reasonable.
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It cannot be pretended that such a principle would free the
law from difficulties for we should still be forced to decide
what constitutes competition, and it was upon a difference of
view upon that point that a dissenting opinion in part rests in
1
the case of legelahn v. GzintneY-.
Upon the point whether mere persuasion to terminate
contracts, or to refrain from entering into them, unaccompanied
by fraud, intimidation, oppression, or threats of temporal loss,
is actionable unless special grounds of justification exist, the
American authorities are unsatisfactory. There are cases
which may fairly be considered as holding malicious persuasion under such circumstances unlawful. s Other cases which
seem to sustain the same proposition have in them some
elements of coercion or fraud.3 Other cases repudiate the
doctrine altogether even where the result of the malicious
persuasion by the defendant is to induce X to commit a
breach of contract with the plaintiff.4 Cases in which malicious
persuasion is coupled with some degree of pressure present
the question in a modified aspect, and have already been
considered.
In this state of the authorities, it is proper to examine the
principles involved and to seek some solution of the problem
which shall tend to uniformity of legal decision. We are met
at the outset by two conflicting propositions
(I) On the one
hand it is said that if the defendant does or threatens to do
that which he has a legal right to do, the plaintiff has no action
against him however malicious his motives or however much
'167 Mass. 92, 104-109.
2
Walker v. Cronin (1871), 107 Mass. 555; Old Dominion Steamship Co.
v. McKenna (1887), 30 Fed. 48 ; Chipley v. Atkinson (1887), 23 Fla. 2o6 ;
Dannenberg v. Ashley (1894), io Ohio Circt. Ct. R. "58; Graham V. St.
Charles St. R. (1895), 47 La. Ann. 214, 1656.
3
Cases cited throughout this article. See also Morgan v. Andrews,
(1895), 107 Mich. 33; Perkins v. Pendleton (1897), 9o Me. x66; Connell
v. Stalker (N. Y. 1897), 20 Misc. 423.

' Cases ante p. 277, note 3.
5See the author's article, "Malice in the Law of Tort," I Northwestern
Law Rev. 65 (March, 1893) ; 0. W. Holmes, Jr., "Privilege, Malice,
and Intent," 8 Harv. L. Rev. I (April, 1894).
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he may have intended to injure the plaintiff." (2) On the other
hand it is said that the defendant has no right to inflict an
intentional injury upon the plaintiff unless there exist a
recognized legal justification, and that it is not necessarily a
legal justification to say that the defendant used as the instrument for accomplishing the harm only means which may be
used for la-dful purposes.'
The first proposition gives us a pretty definite rule. It
carries with it these two simple tests of liability: (I) Either
the act induced must be unlawful, or (2) the means used to
induce the act must be unlawful. Under these tests it would
be unlawful to induce a breach of contract, because a breach
of contract is unlawful; it would be unlawful to induce the
termination of a contract (without breach) or the nonformation of a contract, only if the actor used unlawful means,'
not if he used lawful means. There might still be some
question as to what means are lawful, but in general that
would be tested by the common legal understanding as to
permitted or prohibited acts, and advice, persuasion, the withdrawal of industrial advantages, the termination -or threat to
terminate contracts at will, and the like, would be lawful
means, while misrepresentation, deceit, force or threat of
force, would be unlawful means. There is still left open
under this head the question whether the use of lawful means
by a combination of persons stands upon any different footing
than the use of such means by a single individual. This
question is reserved by some of the prevailing law lords in
Allen v. Flood. It is assumed to be settled in the opinion of
Mr. Justice Holmes in Vegelahn v. Guntner,' where we read:
"I agree, whatever may be the law in the case of a single
' This is the reasoning of Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225 ; Payne v.
Western, &c., Ry., 13 Lea, 507 ; Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 Vt. 21 9 ; Bohn
Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223; Macauley v. Tierney (R. 1.), 33 At. i;
Allen v. Flood, 1898, A. C. i.
2Graham v. St. Charles St. Ry., 47 La. Ann. 214, 1656; Chipley v.
Atkinson, 23 Fla. 2o6; Delz v. Winfree, 8o Tex. 400; Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592; Perkins v. Pendleton, go Me. 166; Allen v. Flood
(1895), 2 Q. B. .2i, and (1898) A. C. i.
3167 Mass. 92, 105.
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defendait (Rice v. Albee, 164 Mass. 88), that when a plaintiff
proves that several persons have conspired to injure his business, and have done acts producing that effect, he shows
temporal damage and a cause of action, unless the facts
disclose, or the defendants prove, some ground of excuse or
justification. And I take it to be settled, and rightly settled,
that doing that damage by combined persuasion is actionable,
as well as doing it by falsehood or by force." ' On the civil
side this .has been very unsatisfactorily dealt with,2 and has
often been dismissed with the statement that what it is lawful
for one to do it is equally lawful for any number of persons to
do. But it is clear from the circumstances and reasoning of
cases where there was combined persuasion that this view is
untenable, and that the force of concerted action may be in
itself unlaWful.' What would be nearer the truth is the statement that what it is possible for a number of persons to do
it may be impossible for one to do.' The mere weight of
numbers may be far more damaging and dangerous than the
fraud or violence of a single individual. It is therefore quite
probable that the two tests will be held to apply only to
individual acts and that combinations to inflict injury may
render the actors liable even though no "unlawful means"
are used further than the oppression or intimidation of concerted action. If so, it would be rational to limit the doctrine
to combinations powerful enough to produce serious harm
and, therefore, menacing in character. It would also be
rational to permit the defence of justification for combination.
There should be a wide gulf between a case where traders or
workmen combine -to get trade or to get higher wages, and a
I Citing Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Morasse v.Brochu, 151
Mass. 567; Tasker v. Stanley, 153 Mass. 148.
2 On the criminal side see Cramp v. Commonwealth (I888), 84 Va. 927;

State v. Donaldson (1867),

32

N.J. L. 151 ; State v. Glidden (1887), 55

Conn. 46.

3 See cases cited above under the discussion of boycott. See also
Dickson v. Dickson|(188t), 33 La. Ann. 126r ; Baughman Bros. v. Askew,
xI Va. Law Jour. 196 (April, 1887). See article by Ernst Freund, ii
Harv. L. Rev. 449 (Feb. 1898).
4
Gregory v. Duke of Brunswick (1843), 13 L. J. C. P. 34.
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case where ill-wishers combine solely to drive a person out of
trade or of work: the result to the plaintiff may be the same
in each case, but in the one case he may hav suffered only
from fair competition, while in the other he may have suffered
from malicious or unjustifiable interference. But this question
is yet to be settled, along with the whole question as to what
is a sufficient justification and, more specifically, what acts of
competition ought to be justified of the law.
The second proposition, that intentional injury is remediable
unless justified, involves more nicety of treatment in practice
than the first. It is a noticeable fact that the common law
judges have ever shrunk from submitting to juries questions
requiring too nice a balancing of conflicting rights. For this
reason they have declined to adopt the admiralty rule of comparative negligence or to permit recovery for mental shock
occasioned by negligence. In the cases under discussion they
have also frequently declined to allow the defendant's liability
to turn upon the question of his motive or his privilege, and
have thought it safer to adopt the simpler rules involved in
the first proposition. Yet this position has not passed unchallenged. Some courts have plainly said that the difficulties of
satisfactory proof ought not to render safe the infliction of
intentional harm, nor ought the inevitable divergence of views
as to the fundamental questions of public policy underlying
the defences of justification to deter the judges frum passing
upon the validity of such defences. After all, a good deal has
been done by the law in the way of fixing the just limits of
freedom of action, and it would be unfortunate if the modern
judges, under new conditions, were to decline to mark new
delimitations as occasion requires. The conflicts indicated
among the cases cited in this article are at bottom a differencc
of view upon this point. Cases like Jackson v. Stanfield,'
Graham v. St. Charles St. Ry.,2 Chipley v. Atkinson,' and
Connell v. Stalker,4 illustrate our second proposition, following
' 137 Ind. 592.
247 La. Ann. 214, 1656.
3 23 Fla. 2o6.
20 Misc. 423.

INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT RELATIONS.

in principle the early case of Keeble v. Hickeringill.' A case
like Robison v. Teras Pine Land Ass'n 2 illustrates the distinction between justifiable and unjustifiable interference. A
case like Vegelahn v. Guntner,3 illustrates the difficulties of
agreement as to whether a particular act is justified. In all of
these cases acts "lawful in themselves" are complained of as
having been so calculated as to produce intentional injury to
the plaintiff. In each the question is, was it lawful, under the
circumstances (not absolutely), for the defendant to employ
these means for the infliction of intentional harm. Is it lawful
for one hundred dealers to threaten not to deal with X, if X
deals with plaintiff ? Is it lawful for one employer to threaten
to discharge all workmen who deal with plaintiff ? Is it lawful for one person to persuade X to discharge plaintiff ? The
answer must depend upon the presence or absence of justification, the reasonableness of the conduct according to the
circumstances and in the light of sound public policy. In each
case "malice" is charged. But malice, as has been said, is
itself shown by the absence ofjustification. "Maliciously" and
"without lawful justification," are identical terms. In most of
the cases considered the grounds of justification, if any, must
be sought in the exercise of the right of competition, not
competition in the narrow sense, but in the broader sense
indicated by Mr. Justice Holmes.4 Reluctant as the courts
have been to enter into a consideration of this right and a
determination of its just limits, it is daily becoming clearer that
they cannot escape their responsibility, and that unless the
law is to settle into the narrow groove fixed by the terms of
the first proposition above they must steadily build up a consistent doctrine upon this point.
Whatever of absolute
uniformity of results might be sacrificed by the rejection of
the first view would be compensated by the approximation to
moral standards that follows upon the adoption of the second.
Instead of shutting the door against plaintiffs intentionally
injured or ruined by defendants, the courts would be open to
I ii East, 574 n.
2 40 S. W. 843.
3 167 Mass. 92.
4 167 Mass. 107,

o8.
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an investigation of the issue whether such injury or ruin was
inflicted in the proper exercise of a common right or was
inflicted without any justification that commends itself to
existing views of public policy or social utility. Differences
and fluctuations there would doubtless be as to what view of
public policy ought to be taken, but better that than to
ignore the existence of patent facts and fashion the law into a
mould unsuited to the rapidly changing conditions of modern
industrial life.
IV. Summary.
The result of the decisions may be thus stated:
I. It is unlawful for B to induce X to break an existing
contract with A; but it must be noted that,-(I) the House of Lords reserves its opinion upon the point
whether it is unlawful unless unlawful means are used, and
(2) some American cases have decided it not to be unlawful
unless unlawful means are used (except, perhaps, in the case of
enticing away servants), and
(3) no attempt has yet been made to determine whether
any grounds of justification may be set up.
II. It is unlawful for B to induce X to terminate (without
breach) an existing contract with A, or to refrain from entering
into a contract with A, either (I) by the use of intrinsically
unlawful means, or (2) probably, by combination or conspiracy
with others unless such combination can be justified.
III. Whether it is unlawful for B to induce X to terminate
(without breach) an existing contract with A, or to refrain
from entering into a contract with A, where no intrinsically
unlawful means are used or combination or conspiracy exists,
there are two views:
(I) that it is not unlawful;
(2) that it is unlawful, unless B can justify his interference
on some principle of industrial or social utility.
IV. These questions must be regarded as open:
(I) What are intrinsically unlawful means, and, particularly,
what acts constitute intimidation?
(2) What constitutes justification, and, particularly, what
Ernest Wilson Buffcut.
constitutes fair competition ?
Cornell University.

